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Abstract
Model checking is an automatic technique used for the veriﬁcation of ﬁnite systems. A model checker
explores the full state space of a given model and checks it against a set of requirements. If a state exists
in which a requirement is not satisﬁed most tools will generate a counter-example. Counter-examples are
useful for debugging a model and determining if an error exists in the modelled system. However, they can
be diﬃcult for end users to understand and this may limit the take-up of model checking in industry.
This paper describes a domain-speciﬁc approach to automatically interpreting counter-examples and
presenting the results in an intuitive form to the end user. Our research extends previous work on model
checking railway signalling control tables with signalling engineers from Queensland Rail.
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1 Introduction
Model checking is particularly interesting for application in industry, especially
to support current processes for verifying safety-critical systems. Model checkers
perform an exhaustive search of the full state space of a given model, testing it
against a set of properties. Most tools either provide the user with an answer
stating that all properties are true, or report a violation in the form of a counter-
example [4]. A counter-example is one possible path describing the values of system
variables starting at an initial state, and showing each transition required to reach
the state in which a property is violated. Model checking is a useful technique for
the veriﬁcation of system designs, however, there are also a number of problems to
1 Thanks to colleagues Kirsten Winter and Peter Robinson and our associates at Queensland Rail: George
Nikandros, David Barney and David Tombs. This project is funded by an ARC Linkage grant LP0455155
2 Email: lionel@itee.uq.edu.au
3 Email: pstroop@itee.uq.edu.au
4 Email: wendy@itee.uq.edu.au
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 174 (2007) 19–35
1571-0661  © 2007 Elsevier B.V.     
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2006.12.027
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
be overcome to achieve acceptance in practice. Counter-examples are diﬃcult for
end users to understand [9], particularly in large systems that can have hundreds
of variables and in which the user may have little or no knowledge about how the
model works.
Previous research between the University of Queensland and Queensland Rail
(QR) produced the Signalling Design Toolset [12] which includes a track layout
editor, a control table generator, a control table editor, and in its preliminary stages
a veriﬁcation manager [14]. One of the control tables produced by the Signalling
Design Toolset is the route table. The generation of the route table has been
formerly veriﬁed [13] and is used as a source of data along with the track layout,
that is trusted to be correct by the veriﬁcation manager.
The veriﬁcation manager is an interface to the NuSMV model checker [2]. It
gathers information about the positions of points, signals and tracks from the track
layout, and the speciﬁcation to lock points and routes from the signal control table.
Models are built automatically in the NuSMV input language, from these spe-
ciﬁcations. The properties to be veriﬁed are generated based on QR’s Signalling
Principles [11] and are expressed in generic terms as invariants such as avoidance
of train collisions and derailment. The veriﬁcation manager invokes NuSMV which
produces a counter-example if a property is violated.
Counter-examples produced by NuSMV typically consist of a ﬁrst state that
includes the values of all variables in the model, and a sequence of subsequent
states which include only those variables that have changed since the previous state.
When using invariants, the system property being veriﬁed is always violated in
the last state of the counter-example. However, this is not necessarily where the
error occurred in the system speciﬁcation [8]. Counter-examples are excellent for
debugging purposes [4], but they can also be diﬃcult for users to understand. Some
problems with counter-examples and model checking include:
• Variables in each state do not always have any relationship to the property that
is violated.
• Counter-examples can have a lot of states. Often many of the states are irrelevant
to the error in the system speciﬁcation and are only needed for the model checker
to show the full path to the error state.
• The state explosion problem [4] makes it necessary to abstract models in order
to reduce the state space [3]. Abstracting a model may mean some data is ex-
cluded or modiﬁed, and the behaviour of the model can vary from the system
speciﬁcation.
These issues make counter-examples diﬃcult for users to interpret. Our counter-
examples are further complicated because the redundancy in the speciﬁcation of
railway interlockings requires us to create models that deliberately leave out some
data in order to check other entries in the speciﬁcation. This causes model behaviour
to vary from a real railway interlocking.
Our counter-examples are linear in shape (see Table 1 for an example of a
counter-example produced using a small interlocking). They provide a good trace
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Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
pos CR = 1Cb
pos FS = 1Cb
incoming train = FS
move CR = 0
move FS = 0
pointState 511 = setR
pointState 500 = setR
pointState 501 = setR
request = req 5 1M
currentRoute CR = NoRoute
currentRoute FS = NoRoute
routelock 5 1M = rtN
routelock 6 1S = rtN
routelock 6 2S = rtN
routelock 7 1M = rtN
routelock 8 1M = rtN
routelock 8 2M = rtN
routelock 1 1M = rtN
routelock 1 2M = rtN
routelock 2 1M = rtN
routelock 3 1S = rtN
routelock 3 2S = rtN
routelock 4 1M = rtN
routelock 5 1M = rtN
routelock 6 1S = rtN
routelock 6 2S = rtN
routelock 7 1M = rtN
routelock 8 1M = rtN
routelock 8 2M = rtN
-> State: 1.2 <-
incoming train = CR
move CR = 1
request = req 6 1S
routelock 5 1M = rtR
-> State: 1.3 <-
pos CR = 1Ca
incoming train = FS
request = req 8 1M
routelock 6 1S = rtR
-> State: 1.4 <-
pos CR = 5Aa
incoming train = CR
move FS = 1
request = reqC 5
currentRoute CR = 5 1M
routelock 8 1M = rtR
-> State: 1.5 <-
pos CR = 8Bc
incoming train = FS
request = reqC 6
routelock 5 1M = rtN
-> State: 1.6 <-
pos CR = 8Aa
pos FS = 5Ab
request = reqN 511
-> State: 1.7 <-
pos CR = 7Aa
pos FS = 8Ab
pointState 511 = setN
request = reqC 8
currentRoute FS = 8 1M
-> State: 1.8 <-
pos CR = 7Ba
pos FS = 8Bd
request = reqC 6
routelock 8 1M = rtN
-> State: 1.9 <-
pos CR = 2Ca
pos FS = 8Cb
move FS = 0
request = reqN 501
routelock 6 1S = rtN
-> State: 1.10 <-
pos CR = 2Ba
pointState 501 = setN
request = req 6 2S
-> State: 1.11 <-
pos CR = 2Aa
move CR = 0
request = req 4 1M
routelock 6 2S = rtR
-> State: 1.12 <-
move FS = 1
request = reqC 6
routelock 4 1M = rtR
-> State: 1.13 <-
pos FS = 1Bd
request = reqC 4
currentRoute FS = 4 1M
-> State: 1.14 <-
pos FS = 1Ab
request = req 3 2S
routelock 4 1M = rtN
-> State: 1.15 <-
pos FS = 2Ab
request = reqC 7
routelock 3 2S = rtR
Table 1
A counter-example for a small interlocking.
of train movement and interlocking behaviour up to where the invariant is violated.
However, we still found that signalling engineers have diﬃculty understanding the
counter-examples produced by NuSMV for our models. An alternative output to
that produced by NuSMV was required. We investigated two approaches for in-
terpreting counter-examples - animation and natural language interpretation. An-
imation is a highly eﬀective technique. However, in our application animating the
railway interlocking and train behaviour from the counter-examples had a number
of problems and was not economical. Interpretation is a simpler approach and re-
quires minimal cost to produce an output that is easily understood by end users.
We developed an interpreter that reads the counter-example, using the route table
and track layout to generate an interpretation. Only the relevant data is presented
to the user in natural language and in a tabular form. By exploiting domain know-
ledge the interpreter signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the output from NuSMV providing a
general description of the error. In some cases the output is more speciﬁc and tells
the user exactly what the error is in the speciﬁcation.
This paper discusses why animation was not suitable in our application and de-
scribes the details of our interpreter. By providing a domain-speciﬁc interpretation,
we show how we can present counter-examples to the user in the natural language of
their domain. We suggest for applications in which end users have little knowledge
of model checking, that a domain-speciﬁc interpretation provides superior feedback.
The results can be tailored to the domain and resented using language consistent
with domain terminology. Section 2 describes the diﬀerent train models and safety
properties generated by the veriﬁcation manager, and how these aﬀect the readabil-
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ity of counter-examples for domain experts. Section 3 presents our investigation of
animation and our prototype for interpreting counter-examples. Section 4 describes
our implementation for interpreting counter-examples, and Section 5 describes the
evaluation of the tool’s eﬀectiveness. We discuss related work in Section 6 and
summarise the results in Section 7.
2 Modelling the Railway Interlocking
The model and property being veriﬁed have signiﬁcant impacts on the readability of
counter-examples. The further a model is abstracted the more diﬃcult it becomes to
interpret. Abstraction often involves leaving some data out of the state space of the
model. This makes it diﬃcult for experts in the application domain to understand
the counter-example when there is information missing that they would like to see.
It is also diﬃcult to interpret a counter-example when there is a lot of data that is
not relevant to the error in the system.
2.1 Railway Interlockings
A railway interlocking is a system of points, signals, and tracks designed to permit
the safe movement of a train through a railway layout. Figure 1 is an example track
layout of a railway interlocking. Points (for example, 511 ) are movable components
on a track, and can be set reverse allowing a train to change from one track to
another at low speed, or set normal allowing the train to continue in its current
direction at high speed. Signals (for example, 5, 6, 7 and 8 ) use colour indications
(for example, red for stop) similar to regular traﬃc lights to indicate to the train
driver if they have the authority to proceed or if they have to stop. Track circuits
(for example, 1C, 5A, 8B, 8A, 7A, 8D and 8C) are sections of track in the railway
interlocking.
8
5
7
6
2
1
8D
511
8B 8A 7A 2A 2B 2C8C
5A1C
8B
Figure 1. A small track layout.
Table 2 is part of the signal control table corresponding to Figure 1. A route
is a path between two facing signals. Table 2 contains only one route, 5(1M),
which starts at signal 5 and ends at 1. The ﬁrst number in the route identiﬁer
(for example, 5 ) is the signal from which the route starts. The second number is
unique for every route attached to a signal. For this paper it can be assumed that
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it begins at 1 and will be incremented for each additional route. The letter M or S
means main or shunt route respectively. The only shunt routes included in the table
are preset shunts. These are shunt routes that behave as a main route. A signal
control table speciﬁes the conditions required for locking a route ready for use (set
reverse), and for holding a route (holding it reverse). The columns titled “Points
Normal”, “Points Reverse”, “Routes Normal”, and “Routes Reverse” include the
requirements of the points and routes for locking and holding a route reverse, while
the “Maint. By Tracks Occ.” column includes the tracks that a train using the
route must clear before the state of the corresponding point or route can change.
The ”Tracks Clear” column provide the tracks that are required clear before a route
can be locked reverse.
Signal Route Requires
Route To Points Routes Route Holding Tracks
No. Normal Reverse Normal Reverse Maint. By Clear
Tracks Occ.
5(1M) 1 511 5A 5A 8B
8A 7A
6(2S) 5A 8B
8(1M) 8(2M) 5A 8B 8A
2(1M) 5A 8B 8A 7A
Table 2
A small signal control table.
2.2 The Train Models
The veriﬁcation manager generates two diﬀerent models described in the NuSMV
input language. The diﬀerent models are used to detect diﬀerent errors in the signal
control tables. All models include a model of the interlocking system and either one
or two trains. System requirements, or safety properties, are modelled as simple
invariants [14], for example, a train must not derail. Models are generated for a
speciﬁc veriﬁcation area, which is a section of a railway interlocking. At the very
least a veriﬁcation area should include one route and all of its opposing routes.
For the purposes of modelling we divide track circuits into segments, each segment
deﬁning a unique traversal of the track circuit. A segment, as shown in Figure 2,
is depicted by the dashed arrow lines such as 8Ba, 8Bb, 8Bc, and 8Bd. The models
generated by the veriﬁcation manager include train(s) and their positions (the track
segment they are occupying), points and their lie (normal/reverse), and routes and
their locking (normal/reverse). There is a variable, currentRoute, for each train in
the model that represents the route that the train is currently using. The rules for
changing the state of the variables come from the Signalling Principles [11] and are
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dependent on the current value of the state variables. The rules for changing signal
aspects in our abstracted model only depend on the values of other state variables
and not the current aspect. We therefore exclude signals from the state space for
eﬃciency, and they are modelled by checking the current values of the variables that
the signal depends on. Trains are well-behaved in the model. They travel along an
interlocking obeying the rules in the Signalling Principles. They stop at red signals
and can also stop on any track segment. There is no speed associated with train
movement.
8B
8Bc
8Ba8Bb
8Bd
Figure 2. An example of track segments for track 8B.
There are two basic models. The ﬁrst model we call the TC (tracks clear) model
and includes a complete representation of the control tables, that is, all signalling
equipment and locking data from the control tables. This model is used to check
for collisions between trains travelling in the same direction. The second model
we call the NTC (no tracks clear, meaning tracks clear are excluded) model. This
model excludes the tracks required clear column in the signal control table in order
to eliminate redundancy, and tests route holding conditions. Trains are allowed to
occupy the same route and even the same segment at the same time. The model
is used to check for derailments and collisions between trains travelling in diﬀerent
directions.
There are four safety properties/invariants that we call derail, opplock, diﬀpath,
and samepath. The derail invariant uses a one-train NTC model and checks for
train derailments when a point is set incorrectly or moves underneath a train. The
opplock invariant is used with a one-train NTC model and states that whenever a
train is on the ﬁrst track of an opposing signal (that is, a signal set for the opposite
direction), there is not a route set reverse from that signal. The diﬀpath invariant is
used with the NTC model and two trains. It is used to check for head-on collisions
and side swipes. The samepath invariant is used with the TC model and two
trains. It is used to check for trains running into the back of each other. Each of
the invariants are used to detect diﬀerent errors in the control table. There is an
overlap between the types of errors that derail, opplock and diﬀpath will detect, but
to detect as many errors as possible each invariant must be veriﬁed.
2.3 Eﬀect of the Model Design on Interpreting Counter-Examples
The design of the model directly aﬀects the counter-examples that are generated.
For example, early models produced by the veriﬁcation manager used a variable for
every route in the veriﬁcation area that represented how far through the route the
train had travelled. This was replaced by the currentRoute variable discussed in
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Section 2.2. The current route variable reduced the number of states and irrelevant
variables in the counter-example and made the raw data more readable. However,
the counter-examples were still diﬃcult for signalling engineers to interpret.
Abstracting the model can make the counter-example more diﬃcult to read. Our
model abstracts by excluding signals. This reduces the number of state variables
but also means that the user does not know what the aspects of any of the signals
are. We have proven through comprehensive testing that the model is accurate.
However, signalling engineers still ﬁnd the model disconcerting.
The NTC model is used for the derail, opplock, and diﬀpath models. This
model excludes tracks clear and is speciﬁcally designed to check errors in the route
locking and holding conditions. The model permits two trains to lock and use the
same route and occupy the same track segment at the same time so that it is able
to check other locking conditions in the signal control table. Errors that allow
trains to occupy the same track segment are checked by the TC samepath model.
When signalling engineers see two trains occupying the same track segment they
immediately assume that there is an error. When they ﬁnd that the control table
does not allow this behaviour and without a thorough knowledge of how the model
works, they will think that it is incorrect and discard the counter-example. It is
therefore necessary to try to hide this detail from users who do not understand the
model.
Counter-examples typically include in each state the variables that have changed
since the previous state. When verifying railway interlockings, to check just one
route it is necessary to include all opposing routes. If an error is detected, the
counter-example produced will contain variables for every route, track segment,
point, train, the current route of each train and so on, even if it is only a single error
that occurs in one route. This can be overwhelming given that a small veriﬁcation
area can contain as many as 30 variables.
3 Approaches to Presenting Counter-Examples
There are a number of approaches to presenting counter-examples to the user, each
of which can be assessed in terms of the cost to produce the counter-example and
the eﬀectiveness of the approach. The most obvious solution is to present the raw
data produced by the model checker; the cost is nil but the eﬀectiveness is unsatis-
factory for reasons already discussed. Other approaches involve a level of translation
to present the data in a more intuitive way. However, when interpreting abstrac-
ted models, the more translation required, the greater the risk that an incorrect
interpretation will be produced. We investigated two approaches, animation and
interpretation, to make counter-examples more informative. Both approaches were
intended to be fully automated and integrated with the veriﬁcation manager and
the Signalling Design Toolset.
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3.1 Animation
Animation is an excellent, user-friendly approach to provide visual feedback to
the user. A feasibility study was undertaken to investigate animation of counter-
examples and its cost-eﬀectiveness. Animating an abstracted model involves a num-
ber of problems. For a railway interlocking it is necessary to animate all signal, route
and point lockings. Our models do not include signals. It would therefore be ne-
cessary to simulate signal behaviour. The only option for doing this would be to
use QR’s Signalling Principles [11]. This introduces the risk that the signals are
modelled incorrectly according to the actual behaviour of the model. The anima-
tion in this case may mask the error or simulate unexpected behaviour. Animating
counter-examples produced by the diﬀpath invariant is also problematic. The anim-
ation would show two trains using the same route and occupying the same segment
at the same time. The user may incorrectly think there is an error as soon as this
happens, however this is not the case. For these reasons, animation is unsuitable
for our application.
3.2 Interpretation
The second approach involves the automatic interpretation of counter-examples to
determine the actual error that caused the collision or derailment. The key concept
is to design an algorithm to interpret the counter-example and produce a description
of the error that caused the safety violation. The algorithm needs to be generic to
handle all of our counter-examples despite the diﬀerences between them. Only the
data relevant to the error should be gathered and presented to the user. To be of
value, the output of the algorithm should provide as much detail as possible without
misleading the user.
We investigated the approach to see if we could reliably identify the error that
caused a counter-example. We designed a prototype algorithm, or interpreter. By
using domain knowledge we were able to locate the error in terms of routes and
the lie of signalling equipment. In some counter-examples we could determine the
exact error, and for the others we produce a more general result in terms of the
lockings of signalling equipment. After trials with Queensland Rail we determined
that the results of the interpretation are best presented to the user in tabular form.
We discuss the details of the implementation in Section 4.
4 Interpreting Counter-Examples
The concepts described in Section 3.2 were prototyped for proof of concept. The
interpreter is a single algorithm used for each of the invariants described in Section
2.2. The interpreter requires three inputs:
(i) The counter-example as a text ﬁle.
(ii) The control table speciﬁcation as an XML ﬁle.
(iii) The counter-example type being interpreted.
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The samepath invariant can be checked at any time. The derail, opplock, and diﬀpath
invariants must be run in this order so that the types of errors detected by each
invariant are limited and some errors can be ruled out. For example, when checking
the diﬀpath invariant there should be no incorrect point settings. Control tables are
also required to be reasonably well-formed. The Signalling Design Toolset produces
acceptable control tables as it performs a number of checks before the model checker
is run [13].
The interpreter performs three basic steps. First the state in which the most
recently used route was locked is found and the data relevant to the error is retrieved
from this state. The data gathered is then interpreted and in the last step is
formatted and presented to the user in a table. A generic format for the output
was designed. An example is shown in Table 3 and corresponds to the layout in
Figure 1. Included is a set of typical entries for illustrative purposes. The results are
presented in the way that signalling engineers currently test railway interlockings.
The ﬁrst row is the route being tested for errors. It is expected that the error will
be found in this route. However, it is possible for the error to be in an opposing
route. This only applies to the opplock and two-train counter-examples as there
are no opposing routes in the derail counter-examples. The second row includes
the location of trains, locking of routes, and lie of points relevant to the error that
was found, and the corresponding action that permits the error to occur, such as a
request to set an opposing route. The result of the action is presented in the third
row; it is a direct consequence of the action and may include a route being set or
points changing lie. The fourth row describes the type of error that occurred. The
default is to describe the error in a general manner to avoid incorrect conclusions,
but in some cases the speciﬁc error in the table can be identiﬁed.
Route Tested 5(1M)
Action 5(1M) used with 8A track occupied.
Request 8(1M) reverse.
What Happened 8(1M) set reverse.
Error 8(1M) set reverse while 5(1M) in use.
Table 3
Template of the interpreted output of a counter-example.
Table 3 is an example interpretation of a collision detected on track 8A. The
cause of the collision is 8A missing from the “Maint. By Tracks Occ.” column of
the signal control table in Table 2. The interpreted output of the counter-example
states that route 5(1M) from signal 5 is currently in use, a train is occupying
track 8A, and route 8(1M) is permitted to be set reverse. Domain experts can
use this information to determine where the error has occurred and quickly locate
and correct the problem. For the table to be useful, the error must be either in
route 5(1M) or 8(1M), otherwise the interpretation would be of less use than the
counter-example produced by NuSMV.
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The data required for interpretation varies for each of the invariants. A descrip-
tion of the data required and the semantics follows.
derail
• point - the point that the train derailed on.
• pointMoved - a boolean that is true if the point moved underneath the train or
while the train was using route or false if the point was already set incorrectly.
• trackOccupied - the track occupied when the point moved underneath the train
or while the train was using route. This is only used when pointMoved is true.
• route - the route that the train was using when it derailed.
opplock
• route - the route that the train was using when the opposing route was set.
• trackOcc - the track occupied by the train when the opposing route was set.
• oppRoute - the opposing route that was set reverse.
diﬀpath and samepath
• primaryRoute - the route a train has been using as its current route for the most
number of state transitions when the invariant is violated.
• secondaryRoute - the route the other train has been using when the invariant is
violated.
• trackOccupied - the track occupied by the train on the primaryRoute immediately
before the state in which the secondary route was set reverse.
The data is interpreted separately for each type of counter-example. The counter-
examples may have more than one format for the output depending on the value of
some of the data. The format and an example of the interpretations for each type
of counter-example are given below.
4.1 Derail Interpretation
There are two behaviours that distinguish derail counter-examples. Either the point
is set incorrectly before the train crosses it, or the point moves while the train is
crossing it. If the value of pointMoved is false then we know that the point lie was
incorrect when the route was set. However, if pointMoved is true we know that the
point moved while the train was in-route. We use a separate format in each case
to express the counter-example. Table 4 is the format used to present the counter-
example to the user when pointMoved is false and Table 5 is the format used when
pointMoved is true. The variable X is used to indicate the lie, or change of lie, of a
point. Its value can be normal or reverse. Tables 6 and 7 are examples of the two
formats given in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. The counter-examples produced are
based on the signal control table from Table 2 and the track layout from Figure 1.
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Route Tested route
Action Request route with point points set X.
What Happened route set reverse.
Error point points not required X for setting route.
Table 4
Template of the interpreted output in which a point is set incorrectly.
Route Tested route
Action route used with trackOccupied track occupied.
Request point X.
What Happened point set X.
Error point points not held by route
while track trackOccupied occupied.
Table 5
Template of the interpreted output in which a point moves while the train is in-route.
Route Tested 5(1M)
Action Request 5(1M) with 511 points set normal.
What Happened 5(1M) set reverse.
Error 511 points not required reverse for setting 5(1M).
Table 6
Example of the output produced when a point is set incorrectly.
Route Tested 5(1M)
Action 5(1M) used with 5A track occupied.
Request 511 normal.
What Happened 511 set normal.
Error 511 points not held by 5(1M) while track 5A occupied.
Table 7
Example of the output produced when a point moves while the train is in-route.
4.2 Opplock Interpretation
Opplock counter-examples have one interpretation. The invariant detects three
types of errors, but the output from the interpreter is generic so that it allows the
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user to easily determine the problem. A template and accompanying example are
provided in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.
Route Tested route
Action route set reverse with trackOccupied track occupied.
Request oppRoute reverse.
What Happened oppRoute set reverse.
Error route used with trackOccupied occupied.
oppRoute set reverse.
Table 8
Template of the interpreted output for the opplock counter-example.
Route Tested 5(1M)
Action 5(1M) used with 8B track occupied.
Request 6(1S) reverse.
What Happened 6(1S) set reverse.
Error 5(1M) used with 8B occupied. 6(1S) set reverse.
Table 9
Example of the interpreted output for the opplock counter-example.
4.3 Diﬀpath Interpretation
Diﬀpath counter-examples have one interpretation. The invariant detects two types
of errors, but the output of the interpreter is generic to allow the user to easily
determine the problem. A template and accompanying example are provided in
Tables 10 and 11 respectively.
Route Tested primaryRoute.
Action primaryRoute set reverse with trackOccupied track
occupied. Request secondaryRoute reverse.
What Happened secondaryRoute set reverse.
Error primaryRoute used with trackOccupied track occupied.
secondaryRoute set reverse.
Table 10
Template of the interpreted output for the diﬀpath counter-example.
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Route Tested 5(1M).
Action 5(1M) set reverse with 8B track occupied. Request 2(1M) reverse.
What Happened 2(1M) set reverse.
Error 2(1M) used with NG8B track occupied. 2(1M) set reverse.
Table 11
Example of the interpreted output for the diﬀpath counter-example.
4.4 Samepath Interpretation
Samepath counter-examples have one interpretation. In every case the exact error
can be detected by the interpreter. A template and accompanying example are
provided in Tables 12 and 13 respectively. The error stated on the last line informs
the user about the track that is missing from the tracks clear column of the signal
control table.
Route Tested route.
Action trackOccupied occupied. Request route reverse.
What Happened route set reverse.
Error trackOccupied not required clear for setting route.
Table 12
Template of the interpreted output for the samepath counter-example.
Route Tested 5(1M).
Action 1C occupied. Request 5(1M) reverse.
What Happened 5(1M) set reverse.
Error 1C not required clear for setting 5(1M).
Table 13
Example of the interpreted output for the samepath counter-example.
5 Evaluation
To evaluate the interpreter a total of 177 counter-examples were generated and
interpreted using our prototype. The control tables of a small veriﬁcation area was
used. Counter-examples were generated by injecting errors into the control table. A
single element was removed such as a track required clear, then the model was built
using our prototype model builder and run using NuSMV. This was done iteratively
until each element in the control table was removed exactly once. Exactly one error
was injected for each test. The interpreted results were manually examined against
the error that had been injected.
Table 14 summarises the results for each of the invariants. Of the 177 counter-
examples, the interpreter correctly identiﬁed the route containing the error in 174
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of the cases. The remaining three counter-examples were produced by the opplock
invariant and the error was found in the the opposing route (oppRoute). In each
cases the user is still able to determine what the error was and the interpretation
provided better feedback than the raw data. Six out of 13 of the interpretations for
the derail counter-examples determined the exact error in the control table. The
remaining seven interpretations were more generic and the error was found in the
primary route. The exact error was determined for all of the errors produced by
the samepath invariant.
Model Tests Run Error in Error in Identiﬁed
Primary Route Secondary Route Exact Error
derail 13 13 0 6
opplock 55 52 3 0
diﬀpath 58 58 0 0
samepath 51 51 0 51
Total 177 174 3 57
Table 14
Results of evaluation
Users at Queensland Rail were shown the raw data output from NuSMV, and
the interpretations produced by our interpreter. Early in the development of the
veriﬁcation manager, domain experts at Queensland Rail struggled to understand
the raw data produced by NuSMV. It took users a considerable amount of time to
understand the train movements and locate the route and interlocking equipment
relevant to the error. The problem was further complicated when the user real-
ised that diﬀerent trains are allowed to occupy the same track at the same time.
Signalling engineers who had never seen the counter-examples were used to test
the interpretations. Initially they were resistant to having to use interpreted data
and questioned why they could not just see the raw data. They felt they had the
knowledge to be able to understand the raw data. However, after looking at our
interpretations they could quickly tell us where they would look for the errors. The
interpretations improved the speed in which the user could locate the error. There
was the added beneﬁt that the user did not have to see that two trains are allowed
to travel on the same track at the same time and that there are no signals in the
model.
6 Related Work
Counter-examples are known to be a usability problem not just for domain experts
but also for engineers designing the models. Most research, for example Clarke et
al. [3], Pasareanu et al. [10] and Dwyer et al. [5], focuses on eliminating false or
spurious counter-examples rather than improving their readability. These papers all
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address false counter-examples produced due to abstraction. This is not a concern
for us as our abstractions are precise leaving the behaviour of the model largely
unchanged.
Huber [7], who also modelled railway interlockings, acknowledged that counter-
examples are a problem for the usability of model checking. He suggests that output
from model checkers can be tailored to the application area and that only modest
eﬀorts are required to modify the model checker and greatly improve the usability.
While the paper indicates Huber did not test his suggestions, the approach is similar
to our work except we modify the output rather than the model checker itself.
Loer and Harrison [9] discuss the usability issues of model checking. Their
approach is to provide a toolkit that is based around the SMV model checker. Their
research on interpreting counter-examples was in its preliminary stages, but one of
their aims was to support visualisation of error traces. Their approach is general in
an attempt to support all problems industrial designers might have, while we focus
on a domain-speciﬁc application to customise the output speciﬁcally for signalling
engineers. The paper describes a number of prototyped approaches including tables,
natural language, scenario templates, scenario scripts, message sequence charts,
operation sequence diagrams and animation. They stated that participants found
that tables and operation sequence diagrams were the most useful. The output
we produce is a combination of tables and natural language scenarios. Operation
sequence diagrams are more complex than needed in our application, as we only
need to show the result of a request placed on a point or opposing route.
Ball et al. [1], Groce and Visser [6], and Jin et al. [8] provide general approaches
to improving counter-example readability. Their work is interesting because it is
not domain-speciﬁc, however, the ﬁnal counter-example is still presented in a form
that relies on the user understanding counter-example traces, and to some degree
the model. Ball et al. describe an approach in which multiple traces describing
diﬀerent errors are produced. Their algorithm exploits the existence of correct traces
to identify transitions that are not in the error trace. This helps to localise the error
and improve the output to the user. Groce and Visser use a similar approach of
searching for negative and positive sets of executions. A negative execution is one
in which the same error is produced with a diﬀerent trace. A positive execution
is a variation on a negative one in which the error does not occur. By comparing
the sets they show that common features and diﬀerences can be used to provide
more useful feedback than just presenting the original counter-example. Jin et al.
describe an approach in which the counter-example is broken into fated and free
segments. Fated segments are actions in a trace towards an error that can not
be avoided while free segments are choices that may prevent the error if they are
avoided. They annotate a counter-example to describe the unavoidable segments
and leave it to the user to decide if the free segments are the fault in the system of
if the fated actions could have been avoided.
The general approach used in each of [1], [6], and [8] is to improve the counter-
example/feedback in order to provide good counter-examples that include more
information related to the error, and less irrelevant information. In our case a
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single counter-example provides the necessary information to locate the error. From
a single trace we can determine which are the relevant variables and then tune the
output speciﬁcally for our targeted users without the overhead required in the above
approaches. While simplifying the counter-examples would aid our users, it is the
behaviour and lack of understanding of the model that is our main concern. Our end
users are also not programmers or Software Engineers and they are not necessarily
familiar with the output from model checkers or compilers.
7 Discussion
Two approaches, animation and interpretation, were considered for presenting counter-
examples to end users. Animation was investigated but is not appropriate for our
application as our model is signiﬁcantly abstracted from the real system. An inter-
preter was designed and prototyped based on the Signalling Principles [11]. This
creates a robust algorithm that can handle any counter-example from our models.
The interpreter searches for key data in the counter-example and presents this in
an interpreted form to the user and excludes all the irrelevant details that often
confuse the user. It was only by using domain knowledge that we could produce
improved interpretations.
To evaluate the interpreter test cases were generated by injecting single errors in
the control table. This approach is reasonable since model checkers stop at the ﬁrst
counter-example they ﬁnd and so it is expected that any counter-examples produced
in practice should not vary from the ones we produced. We also expect that the
general behaviour of the interlocking will still follow the Signalling Principles, and
the output of the interpreter should not vary. However, we still did not test the
prototype against counter-examples found in practice. This was not possible since
the veriﬁcation manager is in its preliminary stages and no real counter-example
data is currently available.
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